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Abstract
Program verification environments increasingly rely on
hybrid methods that combine static analyses and verifica-
tion condition generation. While such verification environ-
ments operate on source programs, it is often preferable to
achieve guarantees about executable code. We show that,
for a hybrid verification method based on numerical static
analysis and verification condition generation, compilation
preserves proof obligations and therefore it is possible to
transfer evidence from source to compiled programs. Our
result relies on the preservation of the solutions of analysis
by compilation; this is achieved by relying on a bytecode
analysis that performs symbolic execution of stack expres-
sions in order to overcome the loss of precision incurred by
performing static analyses on compiled (rather than source)
code. Finally, we show that hybrid verification methods
are sound by proving that every program provable by hy-
brid methods is also provable (at a higher cost) by standard
methods.
1 Introduction
Program verification techniques are widely used to rea-
son about the correctness of applications and play an im-
portant role in fields such as mobile code and embedded
systems where strong guarantees are required. However,
program verification, and in particular deductive program
verification, is traditionally applied to source code, whereas
guarantees are often required about executable code. This
discrepancy is particularly acute in the context of mobile
code, where code consumers do not trust code producers
and may not have access to the source code. Therefore, it
is of interest to develop methods to transfer evidence from
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source code verification to the code consumers. In earlier
work [3], we focussed on transferring proofs from source to
compiled programs in the context of verification methods
based on verification condition generators, that are com-
monly used in Proof Carrying Code [15] and program veri-
fication environments. We have shown that non-optimizing
compilation preserves proof obligations, and therefore that
the certificates of source programs can be reused directly to
validate compiled programs. However, state-of-the-art ver-
ification tools do not use plain verification condition gen-
eration; instead, they rely on hybrid methods, that combine
static analyses and verification condition generation.
The objective of the paper is to extend preservation of
proof obligations to hybrid verification methods. For con-
creteness, we consider a small imperative language with ar-
rays, and we focus on a hybrid method based on a generic
numerical analysis [13, 5] and that can be instantiated to
several numeric domains, including polyhedra.
We first define a hybrid verification method in which pro-
grams are subjected to static analysis, and then to verifica-
tion condition generation. The VCgen exploits the informa-
tion of the analysis in two useful ways: on the one hand,
verification conditions that originate from spurious edges in
the control-flow graph are discarded: more precisely, the
VCgen ignores the case of out-of-bound accesses whenever
the analysis ensures that accesses are within bounds. This
leads to fewer, smaller verification conditions. Furthermore,
the VCgen adds the results of the analysis as additional as-
sumptions to help the user prove the verification conditions.
This is particularly useful for the relational analyses con-
sidered as they can provide part of the invariants required to
prove programs correct.
Then, we prove preservation of proof obligations using
the techniques of Barthe et al. [3]. The proof relies on
knowing that the solutions of the analysis are preserved
by compilation. Although analyzing compiled programs is
known to be less precise than analyzing source programs, as
stated by Logozzo and Fa¨hndrich [12], we achieve preser-
vation of solutions by defining at bytecode level an analysis
that performs a symbolic execution of stacks [21, 20, 5].
Finally, we relate hybrid verification to standard verifica-
tion. We show that programs that are provably correct using
our hybrid method, remain provably correct using standard
verification condition generation; to this end, we define a
compiler that transforms a hybrid specification (combing
logical assertions and analysis results) into a logical one by
giving a logical interpretation of the analysis results.
2 Proof Carrying Code and Hybrid Methods
The general goal of our work [2] is to develop effi-
cient, scalable and trustworthy security architectures for
mobile code. We adopt the view of Proof Carrying Code
(PCC) [15], which emphasizes security through verifiable
evidence, and require that mobile code components come
equipped with a certificate that can be checked efficiently
and independently by the code consumer to ensure that the
downloaded components issued by the producer respect its
policy.
There are two main flavours of PCC, that respectively
rely on type systems and program verification. We briefly
outline the issues of certificate generation and certificate
checking for both of them.
In the type-based approach, certificates are generated au-
tomatically by an analyzer and packaged with the code; on
the consumer side, the certificate is verified efficiently by a
checker that is tighly coupled with the analyzer (in the spirit
of lightweight bytecode verification). In the logic-based ap-
proach, certificates may be generated automatically by cer-
tifying compilers, provided the policies are sufficiently sim-
ple. However, certificates must be constructed interactively
once policies become more complex; preservation of proof
obligations allows the construction of the certificate to arise
at source level. The certificate (that may include some pro-
gram annotations) is packaged with the program. On the
consumer side, the protocol proceeds in three steps: first,
annotations are checked against the policy; second, verifica-
tion condition generation is used to generate proof obliga-
tions; third, certificate checking is performed using a proof
checker, that verifies whether the certificates prove the proof
obligations.
Hybrid methods aim to provide a tight integration of type
systems and logical methods. There are two approaches to
hybrid program verification. In the explicit approach, the
user provides safety annotations that are used by the ver-
ification condition generator, and checked by a annotation
checker. In contrast, the implicit approach advocates that
the annotations are inferred by a static analyzer, and then
used by verification condition generation. Both approaches
are used (sometimes in conjunction) in deductive program
verification, as well as in type-based analyses.
For the hybrid method developed in this paper, program
verification proceeds as follows: first, the annotated pro-
gram is subjected to the static analysis, and a solution is
computed (note the analysis does not take advantage of
the annotations). Then, the verification condition generator
uses the solution to compute a smaller set of proof obliga-
tions, which must then be discharged interactively. On the
consumer side, the program arrives packaged with the so-
lution of the analysis (or as in lightweight bytecode verifi-
cation a partial solution that contains sufficient information
to recompute the solution efficiently), the program annota-
tions, and the certificate, and the checking proceeds in four
steps; first, one checks the correctness of the analysis. The
remaining three steps are as in logic-based PCC.
3 Setting
This section introduces the source language (an impera-
tive language with arrays of integers), the target language (a
stack-based language with jumps), and the compiler.
We assume given two disjoint sets Vs of scalar variables
and Va of array variables, and let V denote Vs + Va. Each
variable in Va has an associated size. Furthermore, we as-
sume given two sets V olds and V
old
a in 1-1 correspondence
with Vs and Va, which are used to store initial values. We
also consider a special variable res, which is used to rep-
resent the value of the program result. Finally, we assume
given a set Lab ⊂ N of labels.
Source Language
Programs are defined as commands, and are decorated with
labels in order to express analysis results:
e ::= e op e | n | x | a[e]
c ::= Skip | [x:=e]k | [a[e]:=e]k | c; c | [return e]k
| if [e ⋊⋉ e]k then c else c | while [e ⋊⋉ e]k do c
where x, a, n and k respectively range over Vs, Va, Z and
Lab, op ranges over (binary) arithmetic operations, and ⋊⋉
over arithmetic comparisons. We assume that labels occur
at most once in commands.
The semantics of source programs is formalized by a
small-step transition relation between states. States may
be intermediate, in which case they consist of a statement
and of a memory, or final, in which case they consist of
a memory, and possibly a tag to denote abnormal termina-
tion. Memories are modeled as pairs of mappings respec-
tively from variables to values and from arrays to indices to
values. We assume that each array a comes equipped with
its size |a| and define the semantic domains of the source
language as follows:
VMem = Vs → Z
AMem = Πa ∈ Va. {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |a|} → Z
Mem = VMem×AMem
StatesI = Stmt× VMem×AMem
StatesF = VMem×AMem× (Z+ {AOB})
States = StatesI + State
s
F
The operational semantics of programs is standard and,
thus, omitted. (See the next subsection for the semantics
of instructions that manipulate arrays.)
Bytecode Language
A bytecode program is defined as a list of instructions. In-
structions either manipulate the memory that stores the val-
ues of variables and the contents of arrays, or manipulate
the operand stack, or perform a conditional or unconditional
jump. The set of instructions is defined by the grammar
ins ::= prim op | push v | load x | store x | return
| aload a | astore a | cjmp⋊⋉ l | jmp l | nop
We denote by p˙[l] the instruction at position l of a bytecode
program p˙. The semantics of bytecode programs is formal-
ized using a transition relation between states. States may
either be intermediate or final; intermediate states consist
of a program counter, an operand stack, that stores the re-
sults of intermediate computations, and a memory. The se-
mantic domains of the bytecode language are defined as fol-
lows, where we implicitly assume that the program counter
is within the bounds of programs:
Stack = Z⋆
StatebI = N× VMem×AMem× Stack
StatebF = VMem×AMem× (Z+ {AOB})
Stateb = StatebI + State
b
F
The operational semantics of programs is standard. We only
provide the operational semantics of the instructions aload
and astore; these instructions may cause abrupt termina-
tion if array accesses are out-of-bound. The rules are given
in Figure 2, where we use the notation [f | s → r] to refer
the function that is identical to f everywhere except in r that
returns s, for any setsR and S and any function f : R→ S.
Compiler
The compiler is standard, and defined in Figure 1; we use
the function init : Stm → Lab to associate to each state-
ment its initial label. We assume label compatibility, i.e.
that the label of a source statement is the same as the label
of the program point for its compilation.
Throughout the rest of the paper we let P be a source
program, and the bytecode program p˙ the result of the com-
pilation of program P .
JnKe = push n
JxKe = load x
Jx[e]Ke = JeKe; aload x
Je1 op e2Ke = Je2Ke; Je1Ke; prim op
J[x:=e]kK = k : JeKe; store x
J[a[e1]:=e2]kK = k : Je2Ke; Je1Ke; astore a
Js1; s2K = Js1K; Js2K
J[return e]kK = k : JeKe; return
J[Skip]kK = k : nop
Jif [e1 ⋊⋉ e2]k then s1 else s2K =
k : Je2Ke; Je1Ke; cjmp⋊⋉k1; k2 : Js2K; jmp l; k1 : Js1K
where k1 = init(s1) = k2 + |Js2K|+ 1
k2 = init(s2) = k + |Je2Ke; Je1Ke|+ 1
l= k1 + |Js1K|
Jwhile [e1 ⋊⋉ e2]k do sK =
k : Je2Ke; Je1Ke; cjmp⋊⋉k1; jmp l; k1 : JsK; jmp k
where k1 = k + |Je2Ke|+ |Je1Ke|+ 2
l= k1 + |JsK|+ 1
Figure 1. Compiler
P [i] = aload a 0 ≤ n < |a|
〈i, ρv, ρa, n :: s〉 〈i+ 1, ρv, ρa, ρa a n :: s〉
P [i] = aload a ¬ 0 ≤ n < |a|
〈i, ρv, ρa, n :: s〉 EX 〈ρv, ρa,AOB〉
P [i] = astore a 0 ≤ n < |a|
〈i, ρv, ρa, n :: v :: s〉 〈i+1, ρv, [ρa | a→ [ρa a | n→ v]], s〉
P [i] = astore a ¬ 0 ≤ n < |a|
〈i, ρv, ρa, n :: v :: s〉 EX 〈ρv, ρa,AOB〉
P [i] = return
〈i, ρv, ρa, n : s〉 〈ρv, ρa, n〉
Figure 2. Semantics of bytecode (excerpts)
4 Preservation of solutions
It is folklore that compilation potentially yields a loss of
precision for relational analyses. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to show that solutions of abstract interpretations are
preserved by compilation, provided one uses symbolic ex-
pressions, as done in [21, 20, 5], to mitigate the presence
of the operand stack and to recover the loss of precision in-
curred by compilation.
Symbolic Expressions
Expressions and guards serve as the interface with the nu-
merical relational domain in the analysis for bytecode. Be-
γ(d1 ⊓ d2) ⊇ γ(d1) ∩ γ(d2)
γ(d1 ⊔ d2) ⊇ γ(d1) ∪ γ(d2)
γ(Jx:=eK♯(d)) ⊇ {〈ρv[x 7→ v], ρa〉 | ρ ∈ γ(d) ∧ v ∈ JeKρ}
γ(Jx[e1]:=e2K♯(d)) ⊇ {〈ρv, [ρa | x→ [ρa a | v1 → v2]]〉 | ρ ∈ γ(d)
∧ v1 ∈ Je1Kρ ∧ v2 ∈ Je2Kρ}
{ρ | JtKρ} ⊆ γ(assume♯(t))
where ρ = 〈ρv, ρa〉.
Figure 3. Requirements over function γ
low we let x range over V .
Expr ∋ e ::= n |x |x[e] | ? | ?[e] | e op e x ∈ V
Guard ∋ t ::= e ⋊⋉ e
The expression ? represents an unknown value; therefore,
expressions are interpreted as sets of possible values. For-
mally, the semantics JeKρ and JtKρ of expressions with re-
spect to an environment ρ = 〈ρv, ρa〉 are defined by the
clauses:
JnKρ = {n}
JxKρ = ρv x
J?Kρ = Z
J?[e]Kρ = Z
Jx[e]Kρ = {ρa x v | v ∈ JeKρ}
Je1 op e2Kρ = {n1 op n2 | n1 ∈ Je1Kρ, n2 ∈ Je2Kρ}
Je1 ⋊⋉ e2Kρ ⇐⇒ ∃ n1 ∈ Je1Kρ, n2 ∈ Je2Kρ • n1 ⋊⋉ n2
Note that the expression ? is not required for analyz-
ing bytecode programs that are achieved by compilation of
the source program, since the stack is empty after storing a
value in an array. However, it provides more precision when
dealing with programs that are not obtained by compilation.
Abstract domain
Following Mine´ [13], we assume given an abstract numer-
ical domain interface, which can be instantiated with stan-
dard relational abstract domains. The interface consists of a
domain D equipped with a partial order ⊑ ⊆ D × D, meet
and join operators ⊓,⊔ : D × D → D, a least element ⊥
and a greater element ⊤. We also assume given abstract as-
signment functions Jx:=eK♯, Jx[e1]:=e2K
♯ : D → D, and a
function assume♯ that maps guards to abstract elements.
Finally, we assume given a monotone concretization
function γ : D→ P(VMem×AMem) mapping abstract
elements to sets of environments in VMem×AMem, and
satisfying the properties in Figure 3.
We define the abstract test JtK♯ : D → D of a guard
t ∈ Guard by JtK♯(l♯) = assume♯(t) ⊓ l♯.
Source Code Analysis
The source code analysis is specified by abstract transfer
functions that map elements of the abstract domain into el-
ements of the abstract domain.
Definition 1 (Abstract Domain for High-Level) A result
of the analysis for the source program P is described by
a mapping Loc in the lattice State♯ = Lab → D.
Definition 2 (Solution) A mapping Loc for the source pro-
gram P is a solution of the analysis if it verifies the con-
straint system defined in Figure 4, i.e. Loc ⊢ P holds.
Byte Code Analysis
As for the source code analysis, the bytecode analysis is de-
fined by abstract transfer functions that map abstract states
into abstract states. In this case, the abstract states are pairs
of the form (s♯, l♯)where l♯ is an element of the abstract do-
main, and the list of symbolic expressions s♯ abstracts the
operand stack. The symbolic abstract domain for stacks is
Expr⋆, where for any set A, A⋆ denotes the domain of lists
with elements in A. The set of variables considered by the
bytecode analysis is the same as in the source code analysis.
Definition 3 (Bytecode Abstract Domain) A result of the
analysis for p˙ is described by a mapping lo˙c in the lattice
˙state
♯
= Lab → (Expr⋆L × D)
An analysis result is a solution of the analysis if it sat-
isfies the constraint system associated to each program.
The constraint system is defined in Figure 5. For in-
structions other than branching or return instructions,
the constraint is defined by partial transfer functions in
Expr⋆ × D ⇀ (Expr⋆ × D), most of them defined as a
symbolic execution affecting the abstract representation of
the operand stack.
Definition 4 (Solution) A mapping lo˙c for the bytecode
program p˙ is a solution of the analysis if it satisfies the con-
straint system of Figure 5, i.e. if lo˙c ⊢ p˙ holds.
Preservation of Solutions
We define first the compilation of a source code analysis
solution and then show that it is a solution for the byte
code analysis. For notational convenience, we denote by
f˙s1;··· ;sn(s
♯, l♯) the composition f˙sn(· · · (f˙s1(s
♯, l♯)) · · · ),
where s1; · · · ; sn is a sequence of byte code instructions.
Let succ(l) denotes the set of successors of a label l, e.g.
succ(l) = ∅ and succ(l) = {l + 1, l′} respectively for
p˙[l] = return and p˙[l] = cjmp⋊⋉ l′. The set pred(l) is
defined as {l′ | l ∈ succ(l′)}.
stm 6∈ {if t then s1 else s2, while t do c, s1 ; s2, return e}
Loc ⊢ {Loc(i)} [stm]i {Fstm(Loc(i))} Loc ⊢ {Loc(i)} [return e]
i {⊥}
Loc ⊢ {JtK♯(Loc(i))} s1 {l
♯
1} Loc ⊢ {J¬tK
♯(Loc(i))} s2 {l
♯
2}
Loc ⊢ {Loc(i)} if [t]i then s1 else s2 {l
♯
1 ⊔ l
♯
2}
Loc ⊢ {JtK♯(Loc(i))} s {l♯} l♯ ⊑ Loc(i)
Loc ⊢ {Loc(i)} while [t]i do s {J¬tK♯(Loc(i))}
Loc ⊢ {l♯} s1 {l
♯
1} Loc ⊢ {l
♯
1} s2 {l
♯
2}
Loc ⊢ {l♯} s1 ; s2 {l
♯
2}
Loc ⊢ {⊤} P {l♯}
Loc ⊢ P
where Fstm(l♯) =
8<
:
l♯ if stm = Skip
Jx:=eK♯(l♯) if stm = x:=e
Ja[e1]:=e2K♯(l♯) if stm = a[e1]:=e2
Figure 4. Definition of the constraint system for the source code analysis.
instr f˙instr instr f˙instr
prim op (e1 :: e2 :: s♯, l♯)→ (xe1 op e2y :: s
♯, l♯) push n (s♯, l♯)→ (n :: s♯, l♯)
load r (s♯, l♯)→ (xry :: s♯, l♯) store r (e :: s♯, l♯)→ (s♯[?/r], Jr:=eK♯(l♯))
aload a (e :: s♯, l♯)→ (xa[e]y :: s♯, l♯) astore a (e1 :: e2 :: s♯, l♯)→ (s♯[?/a], Ja[e1]:=e2K♯(l♯))
nop (s♯, l♯)→ (s♯, l♯)
Instr 6∈ { jmp i′, cjmp⋊⋉ i′, return} f˙instr(lo˙c(i)) ⊑ lo˙c(i+ 1)
lo˙c ⊢ i : Instr lo˙c ⊢ i : return
lo˙c(i) = (e1 :: e2 :: s
♯, l♯) (s♯, J¬(e1 ⋊⋉ e2)K
♯(l♯)) ⊑ lo˙c(i+ 1) (s♯, Je1 ⋊⋉ e2K
♯(l♯)) ⊑ lo˙c(j)
lo˙c ⊢ i : cjmp⋊⋉j
lo˙c(i) ⊑ lo˙c(j)
lo˙c ⊢ i : jmp j
⊤ ⊑ lo˙c(0) ∀i ∈ dom(p˙) • lo˙c ⊢ i : p˙[i]
lo˙c ⊢ p˙
Figure 5. Definition of the constraint system for the byte code analysis.
Remark 5 For each byte code program p˙, we can extract
from the previous constraint system a set of transfer func-
tions (g˙i,j)(i,j)∈Lab2 such that lo˙c ⊢ p˙ if and only if⊔
k′∈pred(k) g˙k′,k(lo˙c(k
′)) ⊑ lo˙c(k) for all k ∈ dom(p˙).
We can extend a partial function ˙locpartial ∈ ˙state
♯
to a
total function lo˙c on dom(p˙) if we set
lo˙c(k)=
{
˙locpartial(k) if k ∈ dom( ˙locpartial)⊔
k′∈pred(k) g˙k′,k(lo˙c(k
′)) otherwise
This definition only makes sense if, by consider-
ing the control flow graph of p˙ whose edges are
{(i, j) | i ∈ dom(p˙) ∧ j ∈ succ(i)}, every loop con-
tain a label in dom( ˙locpartial). We refer to the function lo˙c
as the completion of the partial function ˙locpartial.
Definition 6 (Compiled analysis results) Given an analy-
sis result Loc for the program P , an analysis result com-
piled from Loc is the completion of the function ˙locpartial de-
fined on each k ∈ dom(Loc) by ˙locpartial(k) = ([ ], Loc(k)).
This definition can be shown to be well defined from the
facts that Loc annotates every loop in P and each loop in
the control flow graph of p˙ contains a label of a loop in P .
Lemma 7 Let p˙1, p˙2 and e s.t. p˙ = p˙1 :: l : JeKe :: l
′ :
p˙2. Then, lo˙c(l
′) = fi1;...;ik(s
♯, l♯) = (e :: s♯, l♯) where
(s♯, l♯) = lo˙c(l) and [i1; . . . ; ik] = JeKe.
PROOF. We prove the lemma by structural induction over
expression e.
The following lemma states the main result of this sec-
tion: compilation preserves analysis solutions.
Lemma 8 If Loc is s.t. Loc ⊢ P , then the analysis result
lo˙c compiled from Loc is s.t. lo˙c ⊢ p˙, i.e. it is a solution of
the bytecode analysis.
PROOF. By structural induction over s we can prove that
if p˙ = p˙1 :: k1 :JsK :: k2 : p˙2 and exists l
♯ such that
Loc ⊢ {Loc(k1)} s {l
♯} and l♯ ⊑ lo˙c(k2)
then we have: ∀k ∈ [k1, k2), lo˙c ⊢ k : p˙[k].
5 Preservation of proof obligations
In this section we define two verification frameworks,
respectively for source programs and for unstructured byte-
code of previous sections. As a specification language we
consider first order formulae, namely the domain of asser-
tions A. The validity of an assertions in a particular execu-
tion state η ∈ States is standard. In particular, an assertion
that contains the expression a[e] is invalid in those execu-
tion states in which e is out of the bounds of the array a.
We consider as a program specification a tuple
(pre, annot, post, χ), where the assertion pre is a precon-
dition, post and post are respectively normal and abnormal
postconditions, and the partial function annot : Lab ⇀ A
maps program labels to internal points specifications. The
special variable res may only occur in post, and pre only
refers to variables from V . When specifying a bytecode
program, assertions may refer to the special variable s rep-
resenting the operand stack.
We say that a program satisfies the specification
(pre, annot, post, χ), if every execution starting in a state
that satisfies pre only reaches normal final states satisfying
post or abnormal states satisfying χ, and only reaches inter-
mediate l-labeled points satisfying annot(l). Given a pro-
gram specification (pre, annot, post, χ), a verification con-
dition generator (VCgen) framework provides a set of suf-
ficient proof obligations that ensures that the program satis-
fies the specification.
The VCgens defined in this section are hybrid in the
sense that they take advantage of a previously computed
analysis to reduce the size of proof obligations. We assume
that the result of a relational analysis (Loc and lo˙c respec-
tively for source and bytecode programs) is given as input
to the VCgen. For the abstract domain D, we consider a
relation |= ⊆ D × A such that for any guard b and any
d ∈ D, d |= b indicates that the interpretation of the abstract
element d ensures the validity of the condition b. For exam-
ple, when accessing an array in the expression a[x] we shall
check that the value of the variable x is within the bounds of
the array a. If we instantiate D with the domain of convex
polyhedra, each element d ∈ D represents a set of linear
constraints from which we can discover whether the condi-
tion 0 ≤ x < |a| is satisfied.
A further improvement over standard VCgens consists of
reusing the result of the analysis to strengthen loop invari-
ants. This technique helps reducing the size of annotations
and the burden of interactive specification. To that end, we
assume a concretization function γa : D → A to interpret
abstract elements d ∈ D as assertions.
VCgen for Source Programs
Consider a specification (pre, annot, post, χ) for the source
program P . In this section, we assume that annot suffi-
ciently annotates the program P , that is, for every subpro-
gram while [t]l do c of P , we have that l ∈ dom(annot).
A VCgen for source programs is defined by the set of
proof obligations PO defined as {pre ⇒ φ[
~V/~V old ]} ∪ θ,
where 〈φ, θ〉 = WP(P, post), φ[
~V/~V old ] represents the re-
sult of substituting in φ any array or scalar variable xold
in V olds + V
old
a by x, and the function WP is defined in
Figure 6. In the figure, the assertion inB(e) stands for the
condition that must satisfy an execution state to ensure that
every array access in e is within bounds. For instance, if e
does not contain array expressions inB(e) is defined as true
and inB(a[e]) as 0 ≤ e < |a|. We follow the simplifying
assumption that expressions contain no more than one array
access. For any array variable a and expressions e1 and e2,
upd(a, e1, e2) is interpreted as the array a
′ such that a′[e] is
evaluated to e2 if e1 = e and to a[e] otherwise. To simplify
the presentation of examples, proof obligations for while
statements are split into two assertions corresponding to the
true and false branches.
The function WP considers the result of the analysis
Loc to reduce the size of proof obligations. That is, if
the abstract value Loc(l) associated to the program point
under consideration indicates that any array access in the
statement is within bounds, the returned predicate is sim-
plified by omitting the exceptional postcondition. Con-
sider the program of Figure 7. If the analysis is able to
compute at label k1 an abstract value d such that d |=
0 ≤ i < |A|, the WP function will return the assertion
upd(A, i, A[0])[i+ 1− 1] = A[0], which together with the
loop invariant at label k yields the proof obligation:
A[i− 1] = 0 ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| ⇒
i < |A| ⇒ upd(A, i, A[0])[i+ 1− 1] = A[0]
where the boxed assertion 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| represents the re-
sult of the analysis at the loop entry point.
In contrast, if we do not take advantage of the result of
the analysis we must prove the bigger formula:
A[i− 1] = 0 ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| ⇒
i < |A| ⇒
(0 ≤ i < |A| ⇒ upd(A, i, A[0])[i+ 1− 1] = A[0]
∧¬(0 ≤ i < |A|)⇒ false)
As can be seen from the definition of WP, proof obliga-
tions are of the form φ1∧ γa(d) ⇒ φ2, whereas a standard
VCgen outputs the stronger proof obligation φ1 ⇒ φ2. In
consequence, one can provide the code with a weaker in-
variant φ1 as long as the analyzer is able to eventually infer
the missing information γa(d). For instance, for the sim-
ple program of Figure 7, a standard VCgen will return the
invalid proof obligation
A[i− 1] = A[0]⇒ ¬(i < |A|)⇒ A[|A| − 1] = A[0]
for the path that does not enter the loop. It is sufficient to
provide a stronger invariant, i.e. in conjunction with the
condition i ≤ |A|, to prove the program correct. However,
as an alternative to increasing the size of the program an-
notations, assuming the condition i ≤ |A| is inferred by the
analysis, the hybrid VCgen generates the weaker (and valid)
proof obligation:
A[i− 1] = A[0] ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| ⇒
¬(i < |A|)⇒ A[|A| − 1] = A[0]
VCgen for Bytecode Programs
Let (pre, annot, post, χ) be a specification for the bytecode
program p˙. As with the VCgen for source programs de-
fined above, the precondition pre and the internal annota-
tions annot(l) are strengthened with the result of the analy-
sis. To that end, we interpret the result of the analysis with
the aid of the concretization functions γa : D → A and
γ¯a : (Expr
⋆ × D) → A. A VCgen for bytecode is defined
by extracting the set of proof obligations:
po = {pre ⇒ wpi(0)[V/ ~V old ]}∪
{annot(l) ∧ γ¯a(lo˙c(l))⇒ wpi(l) | l ∈ dom(annot)}
where the predicate transformer wp is shown in Figure 8.
If the program point is annotated, the function wp returns
annot(l). Otherwise it applies the weakest precondition
transformer wpi, defined in terms of the instruction at pro-
gram point l, taking as parameters the annotations computed
for the successor program points. The definition of wp and
wpi is done by induction along the control flow paths of
the program. A program p˙ is sufficiently annotated if the
control flow graph of the program p˙ does not contain unan-
notated loops. The induction principle following from the
definition of sufficiently annotated programs is sufficient to
ensure that wp and wpi are well defined For a list s, s[0]
and s[1] represent the first and second element of s, and ↑s
denotes the result of removing the first element from s.
Preservation of Proof Obligations
Consider the specification (pre, annot, post, χ) for source
program P , and assume that annot is a sufficient annotation
for P , i.e. every loop is annotated. Let (pre, annot, post, χ)
define as well the specification for the bytecode program p˙.
From previous results, we know that if annot is a sufficient
annotation for P then it is also a sufficient annotation for
the result of the compilation p˙. Let Loc be a solution of the
analysis for the source program P , and lo˙c a solution of the
analysis for the bytecode program p˙, compiled from Loc as
described in Section 4.
We assume that the concretization functions satisfy the
property γ¯a([], d) = γa(d), so that the interpretation of ab-
stract analysis results in the source and bytecode sides co-
incides (recall that by definition lo˙c(l) = ([ ], Loc(l)) for
every l in dom(Loc).) In addition, for any expression e
and any d ∈ D, if e does not contain array expressions, i.e.
inB(e) = true, then d |= inB(e).
The following result about the compilation of expres-
sions is helpful to prove preservation of proof obligations:
Lemma 9 Let p˙ be equal to p˙1 :: l1 :JeKe :: l2 : p˙2. Then
wpi(l1) is equal to wpi(l2)[
e::s/s] if lo˙c(l1) |= inB(e) and
equal to inB(e)⇒ wpi(l2)[
e::s/s]∧¬inB(e)⇒ χ otherwise.
The coincidence of the sets of proof obligations PO and
po is stated in the following lemma, provided the bytecode
program p˙ is the result of compiling the source program P .
Proposition 10 For every subprogram c of P , proof obliga-
tions corresponding to c are equal to the proof obligations
in p˙ that correspond to the subsequence JcK.
Consider, the bytecode program of Figure 9 compiled from
the example in Figure 7. One can see that the proof obliga-
tion at label k is
A[i− 1] = A[0] ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| ⇒
(i < |A| ⇒ (A[i− 1] = A[0])[upd(A,i,A[0]),i+1/A,i]) ∧
(¬(i < |A|)⇒ A[|A| − 1] = A[0])
which is equal to the proof obligation at label k for the
source program of Figure 7.
6 From hybrid VCgen to VCgen
In this section we show a correspondence between the
hybrid VCgen for bytecode of previous sections with a stan-
dard VCgen that does not take advantage of the result of
the analysis. More precisely, interpreting the abstract re-
sult as logical formulae, we show an equivalence between
the proof obligations of both VCgen’s. Assuming that the
relation |= satisfies a correctness condition, soundness of
WP(Skip, φ) = 〈φ, ∅〉 WP([return e]l, φ) = 〈ckB(e, post[e/res]), ∅〉 WP([x:=e]
l, φ) = 〈ckB(e, φ[e/x]), ∅〉
WP([a[e1]:=e2]
l, φ) = 〈ckB(e2, ckB(a[e1], φ[
upd(a,e1,e2)/a])), ∅〉
WP(c1, φ) = φ1, θ1 WP(c2, φ) = φ2, θ2
WP(if [t]l then c1 else c2, φ) = 〈ckB(t, t⇒ φ1 ∧ ¬t⇒ φ2), θ1 ∪ θ2〉
WP(c, φ) = 〈φ1, θ〉 Φ = (t⇒ φ1) ∧ (¬t⇒ φ)
WP(while [t]l do c, φ) = 〈annot(l), {annot(l) ∧ γa(Loc(l))⇒ ckB(t,Φ)} ∪ θ1〉
WP(c1, φ2) = 〈φ1, θ1〉 WP(c2, φ) = 〈φ2, θ2〉
WP(c1; c2, φ) = 〈φ1, θ1 ∪ θ2〉
where the expression ckB(e, ϕ) stands for ϕ if Loc(l) |= inB(e) and the formula inB(e)⇒ ϕ ∧ ¬inB(e)⇒ χ otherwise.
Figure 6. Definition of WP function
// pre : true, χ : false
[i := 1]k0 ;
// A[i− 1] = A[0]
while [i < |A|]k do {
[A[i] := A[0]]k1 ; [i := i+ 1]k2
}
// A[|A| − 1] = A[0]
...
Figure 7. Program example
the hybrid VCgen follows from soundness of the standard
VCgen. In addition, soundness of the VCgen for source
programs follows if the compiler is semantics preserving.
Given a specification (pre, ˆannot, post, χ) for the byte-
code program p˙, a non-hybrid VCgen extracts the set of
proof obligations pˆo ∪ {pre ⇒ wˆpi(0)[V/V old ]}, where wˆpi
and pˆo are defined in Figure 10. To avoid ambiguity, in
the sequel we make explicit some parameters needed in the
definition of wpi, wp, wˆpi and wˆp. We write for instance
wˆpi(l, ˆannot, post, χ) instead of simply wˆpi(l).
Let lo˙c be a result of the analysis for the bytecode pro-
gram p˙. Consider the specifications (pre, annot, post, χ)
and (pre, ˆannot, post, χ) for program p˙, such that for all l in
dom(annot), ˆannot(l) is defined as annot(l) ∧ γ¯a(lo˙c(l)).
We say that the relation |= ⊆ D×Guard is valid if for ev-
ery abstract element d ∈ D and b ∈ Guard we have that
d |= b implies the universal validity of γa(d) ⇒ b. The
result of the analysis lo˙c is said verifiable if the set of proof
obligations po(true, γ¯a ◦ lo˙c, true, true) are provable.
Lemma 11 For every label l in the program p˙:
wpi(l, annot, post, χ)∧γ¯a(lo˙c(l))⇒ wˆpi(l, ˆannot, post, χ)
provided the relation |= ⊆ D × Guard is valid, and the
analysis lo˙c is verifiable.
wpi(l) = wp(l + 1)[s[0] op s[1]::↑
2
s/s] p˙[l] = prim op
wpi(l) = wp(l + 1)[v::s/s] p˙[l] = push v
wpi(l) = wp(l + 1)[s[0],↑s/x,s] p˙[l] = store x
wpi(l) = wp(l + 1)[x::s/s] p˙[l] = load x
wpi(l) = ckB(wp(l + 1)[upd(a,s[0],s[1]),↑
2
s/a,s]) p˙[l] = astore a
wpi(l) = ckB(wp(l + 1)[a[s[0]]::↑s/s]) p˙[l] = aload a
wpi(l) = s[0] ⋊⋉ s[1] ⇒ wp(l′)[↑
2
s/s] p˙[l] = cjmp⋊⋉ l′
∧¬(s[0] ⋊⋉ s[1])⇒ wp(l + 1)[↑
2
s/s]
wpi(l) = wp(l′) p˙[l] = jmp l′
wpi(l) = wp(l + 1) p˙[l] = nop
wpi(l) = post[s[0]/res] p˙[l] = return
where ckB(ψ) stands for ψ if lo˙c(l) |= inB(x[s[0]]) and inB(x[s[0]])⇒
ψ ∧ ¬inB(x[s[0]])⇒ χ otherwise.
wp(l) =

annot(l) if l ∈ dom(annot)
wpi(l) otherwise
Figure 8. VCgen for bytecode programs
The soundness of the VCgen po follows from the follow-
ing result and the soundness of the standard VCgen pˆo:
Proposition 12 The provability of the set of proof obliga-
tions pˆo(pre, ˆannot, post, χ) follows from the provability of
po(pre, annot, post, χ).
Consider for instance the sequence of bytecode in Fig-
ure 9. Recall that annot is defined as A[i − 1] = A[0] and
A[|A| − 1] = A[0] in k and k′′ respectively. Let ˆannot be
defined by strengthening annot with the result of the anal-
ysis, i.e. ˆannot(k) = annot(k) ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| (we can let
ˆannot(k′′) = annot(k′′)). Let Ψ be the weakest precondi-
tion computed by the non hybrid VCgen at label k1:
0 ≤ i < |A| ⇒ (upd(A, i, A[0])[i+ 1− 1] = A[0]
∧ 0 ≤ i+ 1 ≤ |A|)
∧¬(0 ≤ i < |A|)⇒ false
which, from Lemma 11 is implied by the hybrid wp and the
k0 : push 1
store i
k : jmp k′
k1 : push 0
aload A
load i
astore A
k2 : push 1
load i
prim +
store i
k′ : push |A|
load i
cjmp<k1
k′′ : . . .
Figure 9. Program example
wˆpi(l) = ckB(wˆp(l + 1)[upd(x,s[0],s[1]),↑
2
s/x,s]) p˙[l] = astore x
wˆpi(l) = ckB(wˆp(l + 1)[x[s[0]]::↑s/s]) p˙[l] = aload x
wˆpi(l) = wpi(l) otherwise
where ckB(ψ) stands for inB(x[s[0]]) ⇒ ψ ∧ ¬inB(x[s[0]]) ⇒ χ re-
gardless of whether lo˙c(l) |= inB(x[s[0]]) is satisfied.
wˆp(l) =

annot(l) if l ∈ dom(annot)
wˆpi(l) otherwise
pˆo = { ˆannot(l)⇒ wˆpi(l) | l ∈ dom( ˆannot)}
Figure 10. Non-hybrid bytecode VCgen
result of the analysis, i.e. by
upd(A, i, A[0])[i+ 1− 1] = A[0] ∧ 0 ≤ i < |A|
As stated in Proposition 12, if the proof obligations returned
by the hybrid VCgen are valid, and assuming the analysis is
verifiable, we have that
A[i− 1] = A[0] ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| ⇒ i < |A| ⇒
upd(A, i, A[0])[i+ 1− 1] = A[0]
and 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| ⇒ i < |A| ⇒ 0 ≤ i < |A| are provable.
Then, it follows that the verification condition
A[i− 1] = A[0] ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ |A| ⇒ i < |A| ⇒ Ψ
returned by the standard VCgen is provable.
The above results establish that hybrid verification meth-
ods can be mapped to standard verification methods. In the
context of PCC, one would like to establish the stronger re-
sult that hybrid certificates can be compiled into standard
certificates. It is in fact possible to prove such a result,
using the framework of [4]. However, the compilation of
hybrid certificates into standard certificates requires using
a certifying analyzer, that generates automatically logical
proofs of correctness of the results of the analysis. While it
is possible to avoid hybrid methods altogether, e.g. to rely
on standard PCC architectures, hybrid methods are benefi-
cial both for the code producer because they significantly
reduce the number of proof obligations required to certify
code, and for the code consumer, because they yield cer-
tificates that are more compact and more efficient to check.
Cetificate Translation from a hybrid to a standard VCgen is
interesting for PCC scenarios in which original proof obli-
gations are generated by a hybrid VCgen, but in which the
targeted Trusted Computed Base has no support for hybrid
certificates.
7 Related work
Some authors have formalized and proved the soundness
of hybrid verification methods. For example, Wildmoser,
Chaieb and Nipkow [19] have used Isabelle/HOL to prove
the soundness of hybrid methods for Java bytecode; they
rely on interval analyses to detect arrays out of bounds, and
implement a proof-producing version of the analysis that
generates proofs that the results of the analysis is correct.
More recently, Gre´goire and Sacchini [8] have formalized in
Coq a hybrid verification method for JVM programs. They
focus on a null-pointer analysis; although the analyzer is
not formalized in Coq, Hubert and co-workers [11] provides
a good starting point for carrying such an implementation.
The method of Gre´goire and Sacchini [8] supports bidirec-
tional interaction between the analysis and verification con-
dition generation, as the static analysis can extract useful
information from the program annotations, at the same time
as the results of the analysis are exploited by the verification
condition generator to reduce the number of proof obliga-
tions (although we have not done so, it is relatively easy to
integrate such bidirectional interaction in our work).
It is folklore that deductive verification methods can be
viewed as abstract interpretation [7, 6]. Logical abstract
interpretation [9] explores the interaction between analysis
and verification from the perspective of using theorem prov-
ing to improve the precision of abstract interpretations, and
combinations of them.
Finally, the paper is closely related to previous works on
proof-transforming compilation, and proof-producing pro-
gram analyses. Saabas and Uustalu [17] provide an al-
gorithm to transform proofs in Hoare logic into proofs in
compositional proof systems for assembly programs. Mov-
ing to more realistic languages, Mu¨ller et al. define proof-
transforming compilation for Java and Eiffel [1, 14, 16],
The aforementioned works, as the current paper, focus
on non-optimizing compilation. Compiling proofs along
program optimizations require using proof-producing anal-
yses, that produce formal proofs of their correctness. Such
analyses are also required to extend the results of Section 3
to certificates. Proof-producing analyses have been studied
by several authors, including Wildmoser, Chaieb and Nip-
kow [19] in the context of verification condition generation
for a bytecode language and Seo, Yang and Yi [18] in the
context of a Hoare logic for a simple imperative language.
8 Conclusion
Program verification environments increasingly rely on
hybrid methods to prove software correctness. In this paper,
we have shown that hybrid verification methods at source
and bytecode levels are tightly related, and that hybrid ver-
ification methods can be “compiled” into standard verifica-
tion methods, which ensure that hybrid methods are sound.
Our next goal is to extend our results to more realistic
languages and analyses. Modern languages include fea-
tures, e.g. exceptions, that can potentially yield very large
control flow graphs, making hybrid certificates particularly
necessary; we expect that our results on preservation of
proof obligations for Java [3] will scale to hybrid methods.
Besides, it would be beneficial to allow hybrid methods
to rely on more advanced static analyses that provide valu-
able information for proving properties of programs. We in-
tend to focus on the recent analysis of [10], and to develop
a hybrid verification method based on this analysis.
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